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Abstract—Layout camouflaging can protect the intellectual
property of modern circuits. Most prior art, however, incurs
excessive layout overheads and necessitates customization of
active-device manufacturing processes, i.e., the front-end-of-line
(FEOL). As a result, camouflaging has typically been applied
selectively, which can ultimately undermine its resilience. Here,
we propose a low-cost and generic scheme—full-chip camou-
flaging can be finally realized without reservations. Our scheme
is based on obfuscating the interconnects, i.e., the back-end-of-
line (BEOL), through design-time handling for real and dummy
wires and vias. To that end, we implement custom, BEOL-centric
obfuscation cells, and develop a CAD flow using industrial tools.
Our scheme can be applied to any design and technology node
without FEOL-level modifications. Considering its BEOL-centric
nature, we advocate applying our scheme in conjunction with
split manufacturing, to furthermore protect against untrusted
fabs. We evaluate our scheme for various designs at the physical,
DRC-clean layout level. Our scheme incurs a significantly lower
cost than most of the prior art. Notably, for fully camouflaged
layouts, we observe average power, performance, and area over-
heads of 24.96%, 19.06%, and 32.55%, respectively. We conduct
a thorough security study addressing the threats (attacks) related
to untrustworthy FEOL fabs (proximity attacks) and malicious
end-users (SAT-based attacks). An empirical key finding is that
only large-scale camouflaging schemes like ours are practically
secure against powerful SAT-based attacks. Another key finding
is that our scheme hinders both placement- and routing-centric
proximity attacks; correct connections are reduced by 7.47X, and
complexity is increased by 24.15X, respectively, for such attacks.
Index Terms—Hardware security, IP protection, Reverse en-
gineering, IC camouflaging, Interconnects, Split manufacturing,
Boolean satisfiability, Proximity attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
ENSURING the integrity, security, and trustworthiness ofintegrated circuits (ICs) have become major concerns in
recent years [2], [3]. One important aspect here is that the intel-
lectual property (IP) of modern ICs can be duplicated without
consent, resulting in financial losses for IP vendors, which
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Fig. 1. Concepts for layout camouflaging. Most prior works target at the
active layer, or front-end-of-line (FEOL), by stealthy manipulation of gate
contacts or dopant regions. In contrast, our scheme is based on obfuscation
of the interconnects, i.e., the back-end-of-line (BEOL).
are estimated to amount to several billion dollars per year.
This is because modern ICs are the products of distributed
and globalized supply chains. If an IC design is not protected,
any of the various entities involved in such outsourced supply
chains may reconstruct/pirate the underlying IP. Protecting the
IP can also help to mitigate other hardware-centric threats, e.g.,
hardware Trojans [3]. Besides, a malicious end-user, i.e., an
adversary without direct access to the design and fabrication
process, can resort to reverse engineering of ICs to obtain
the IP. The tools and know-how for such reverse-engineering
attacks are becoming more advanced and widely available,
rendering this a practical and severe threat [3], [4].
The traditional goal of layout camouflaging (LC), or simply
camouflaging, is to mitigate reverse-engineering attacks by
end-users. Therefore, camouflaging alters the physical appear-
ance of an IC such that it is arduous for the attacker to
understand the true IC design (Fig. 1). In other words, when
facing camouflaged ICs, an attacker shall be rendered unable
to infer the chip IP directly, as the IP is hidden within an
obfuscated physical design.1
Camouflaging is implemented traditionally at the device
layer, e.g., by “look-alike” or ambiguous gates [6], [7], by
secretly configured multiplexers [8], [9], or by the threshold-
dependent configuration of gates [10]–[12]. We note that prior
art requires a fully trustworthy fabrication process, as the
device obfuscation has to be realized by the foundry. We
also note that most schemes incur a high layout cost. For
example, the XOR-NAND-NOR primitive proposed in [7] is
expected to incur 4× area, 5.5× power, and 1.6× delay cost
in comparison to a conventional NAND gate. For another
scheme by Akkaya et al. [13], demonstrated in a 65nm
chip, an equivalent primitive incurs even higher APD cost,
namely 7.3× area (A), 9.2× power (P), and 6.6× delay (D).
1IP protection can also be realized at the system level, e.g., by obfuscating
finite state machines [5]. However, such techniques are orthogonal and
independent from the physical obfuscation we consider in this work.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF SELECTED LAYOUT CAMOUFLAGING (LC) SCHEMES
Work LC Trusted Foundry LC APD Resilience toStyle Assumed? Scale Cost Algorithmic Attacks
[7] Contact Yes “Small” “Very high” Vulnerable [14], [This]
[17] Contact/Dopant Yes “Small” “Moderate” Vulnerable [23]
[11] Dopant Yes “Small” “Very high” Vulnerable forsmall-scale LC [This]
[27] Interconnects Yes “Small” “Low” Vulnerable [This]
Ours Interconnects Untrusted FEOL, “Large” “Moderate” Superior; attackstrusted BEOL yet to succeed
n:1
n:1
Y
Regular FEOL
Obfuscated BEOL
a
w
b
x
Fig. 2. Our concept is based on secret n:1 mappings at the BEOL, also using
dummy vias and wires, thereby obfuscating the real inputs for any gate (not
only two-input XOR gates). The set of obfuscated functionalities depends on
n, the randomized selection of the dummy nets, and the gate type.
Accordingly, the application of such schemes is suggested to
be limited, which in turn may compromise their resilience as
discussed next.
Assuming that prior schemes are applicable only to selected
parts of an IC in practice, an essential challenge is where
and to what extent camouflaging shall be effected. Ideally,
an attacker’s effort to resolve a carefully camouflaged netlist
would be exponential in the number of camouflaged gates [14].
To achieve such resilience, among other approaches, Rajen-
dran et al. [7] proposed to camouflage gates that are inter-
fering, i.e., gates that cannot be resolved individually. Still,
advances for Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solvers have enabled
powerful attacks on camouflaging (and logic locking) [14]–
[16], undermining the promises of [7] and other works. Even
for hardened schemes such as [17]–[19], which explicitly
aim for exponential attack resilience, tailored SAT and other
attack frameworks have been proposed [20]–[23]. Therefore,
the trade-off between resilience and cost/applicability remains
an open challenge for camouflaging.
In Table I, we provide a high-level comparison of the
selected prior art and our work. We also discuss the prior art
and other relevant security aspects further in Sec. II. Besides,
a comprehensive overview of camouflaging is given in [24],
and IP protection in general is reviewed in [25], [26].
In this paper, we make the following case: to remain
resilient, at least as long as foreseeable, camouflaging should
be applied at large scales, ideally for the full chip. Alternative
approaches are required to enable large-scale camouflaging,
especially when aiming for low cost and fewer dependencies
on trustworthy fabrication. To that end, we propose and eval-
uate a novel concept based on obfuscating the interconnects
(Fig. 2). Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) Based on the emerging notion of obfuscating the intercon-
nects, we enable resilient and large-scale camouflaging,
up to full-chip camouflaging. To do so, we develop a
security- and cost-driven, end-to-end CAD methodology,
and we propose novel back-end-of-line (BEOL)-centric
camouflaging primitives which are applicable for all
types of regular gates. That is, our primitives do not
require any modification at the front-end-of-line (FEOL)
layers and can, therefore, be easily integrated into any
design, technology, and CAD flow. We leverage Cadence
Innovus, and make our layouts publicly available in [28].
2) The fact that our work realizes BEOL-centric camouflag-
ing suggests an application of split manufacturing [2],
[29], [30]. Doing so allows us, for the first time for
camouflaging, to hinder fab adversaries in addition to
malicious end-users.
3) We conduct a thorough evaluation of our scheme concern-
ing the APD (or PPA—power, performance, and area)
cost for camouflaged, DRC-clean physical layouts. In
contrast, most prior art investigate their camouflaging
primitives only as stand-alone devices, without applying
them in actual layouts; we argue that this is overly opti-
mistic. Thus, our work is one of the very few providing
a comprehensive layout-level evaluation, and we also
provide an in-depth and comprehensive study on APD
cost for a wide range of prior camouflaging schemes.
4) We assess the resilience of our scheme and compare it
against previous works. For our scheme, we introduce
the notion of practically secure camouflaging which
seeks to impose high computational costs on SAT-based
attacks while, unlike provably secure camouflaging, not
requiring additional, dedicated circuit structures. For that
assessment, we employ powerful SAT-based attacks [31],
[32] on traditional benchmarks as well as large VLSI
benchmarks. With regards to split manufacturing, we
employ state-of-the-art proximity attacks [33], [34] and
demonstrate that our scheme is also resilient against such
fab-based adversarial activities.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
A. Split Manufacturing
A technique orthogonal to camouflaging is split manufac-
turing [2], [29], [30]—while camouflaging seeks to protect
against malicious end-users, split manufacturing aims to hinder
adversaries acting at manufacturing time. Typically, split man-
ufacturing means to split the IC manufacturing flow into FEOL
and BEOL processes, i.e., the front-end-of-line and back-end-
of-line steps, where the FEOL is outsourced, and the BEOL
is realized by some trusted in-house or on-shore facility. Note
that split manufacturing has been demonstrated; [30] describes
promising measurement results for an IBM/GlobalFoundries
130nm split process, and [29] summarizes further results, most
notably for a 28nm split process run by Samsung across Austin
and South Korea.
For the FEOL foundry, the resulting partial layout appears
as “sea of gates,” with most of the interconnects missing.
Therefore, it is argued that an adversary residing in the foundry
cannot infer the full design easily, which hinders him/her from
both IP piracy and Trojan insertion. The advantages of split
manufacturing are as follows: 1) it allows for commissioning
high-end, state-of-the-art, yet untrusted, FEOL facilities; 2) the
BEOL is significantly less complex and cheap to implement
compared to the FEOL and, thus, technology requirements
for the trusted facility are moderate; 3) the supply chain can
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TABLE II
POST-LAYOUT RESULTS ON SELECTED ITC-99 BENCHMARKS AND RESULTING CAMOUFLAGING LIMITS FOR SELECTED SCHEMES
Benchmark Total
Instance Counts of Relevant Cells Resulting Camouflaging Limit [% of Total Instances]
Instances XOR2 XNOR2 OR2 NOR2 NAND2 AND2 INV BUF AND3 NAND3 XOR-type STF-type XOR-NAND-NOR Threshold Ours[17] [17] [7] [11]
b14 C 3,263 11 143 144 156 930 248 636 23 22 89 68.89 58.57 33.62 50.01 100
b15 C 4,972 16 61 133 263 1,285 321 844 156 24 128 63.44 54.4 31.46 41.81 100
b17 C 16,169 34 207 553 1,012 3,561 876 3,143 536 41 465 63.01 54.71 28.49 38.61 100
b20 C 7,184 40 288 318 355 2,087 451 1,489 117 49 263 71.39 61.46 34.55 49.26 100
b21 C 7,318 33 341 407 401 1,949 551 1,505 110 41 206 70.65 60.3 32.56 50.31 100
b22 C 10,839 72 457 544 595 3,058 653 2,194 170 60 379 70.61 61.09 34.37 49.63 100
Average – – – – – – – – – – – 67.99 58.42 32.51 46.61 100
We use the NanGate 45nm library [43]. All benchmarks are set up for iso-performance at 5ns. The resulting camouflaging limit (right) is the ratio of cells that can be camouflaged
over total cell instances, the latter as obtained by regular synthesis using the full library (left). Cells described as relevant for XOR-type camouflaging in [17]: BUF, INV, AND2,
NAND2, OR2, NOR2, AND3, NAND3; cells described as relevant for STF-type camouflaging in [17]: BUF, INV, AND2, NAND2, OR2, AND3; cells assumed relevant for
XOR-NAND-NOR camouflaging [7]: XOR2, NAND2, NOR2; cells assumed relevant for threshold-dependent camouflaging [11]: AND2, NAND2, NOR2, OR2, XOR2, XNOR2.
remain largely as is, and additional steps are only required for
preparation, shipping, and finalization of FEOL wafers.
Since physical layouts are designed holistically, at least
when using regular and security-unaware CAD tools, various
hints on the BEOL can remain within the FEOL. Wang et
al. [35] proposed a so-called proximity attack, where they
formulated various FEOL-level hints within a network-flow
attack model.2 For selected designs, they succeeded to infer
the majority of missing BEOL wires. Magan˜a et al. [36]
proposed various attacks that focus on FEOL-level routing,
and they conclude that such efforts are more effective than
relying solely on the placement. Zhang et al. [37] and Li et
al. [38] leveraged machine learning for advanced and scalable
attack frameworks. However, neither of those attacks [36]–
[38] recovers an actual netlist; they instead provide sets of
most probable BEOL connections. Therefore, an attacker re-
quires further effort and know-how before he/she can obtain a
complete netlist. In any case, attacks which can achieve 100%
correctness when inferring all BEOL wires of industrial, large-
scale designs, possibly even with some placement- or routing-
level perturbations introduced for protection (e.g., see [39]–
[42]), are yet to be demonstrated.
B. Camouflaging at the FEOL: Limitations and Vulnerabilities
Prior art targets mainly at the active device layer, the FEOL,
and, thus, requires (i) custom design of camouflaged gates,
along with library characterization, and (ii) some modifica-
tions of well-established and optimized device manufacturing
processes. It is easy to see that both will incur efforts and
financial cost, that is on top of any layout overheads.
Regarding layout overheads, as already indicated in Sec. I,
most existing camouflaging schemes incur a high cost and are
accordingly limited for practical use. For example for Zhang’s
work [9], we observe 464%, 638%, and 63% overheads for
area, power, and delay, respectively, when camouflaging all
gates of the ISCAS-85 benchmark c7552; these numbers are
13.92×, 37.51×, and 4.47× higher than ours for the same
scenario (see also Sec. VI-B for more comparisons).
Furthermore, it is important to note that prior art can be
constrained to begin with, namely by synthesis limiting the
2The hints are: (i) physical proximity of gates, (ii) avoidance of combina-
torial loops, which are rare in practice, (iii) timing and load constraints, and
(iv) orientation and routing direction of wires.
TABLE III
POST-LAYOUT AREA (A), POWER (P), AND DELAY (D) BASELINE COST,
Without Camouflaging, BUT FOR CONSTRAINED SYNTHESIS
Benchmark XOR-type [17] XOR-NAND-NOR [7] Threshold [11]A P D A P D A P D
b14 C 5.63 -7.25 -1.85 18.24 8.81 -0.27 13.24 1.21 -0.27
b15 C 24.99 11.79 -1.06 39.05 31.93 -0.79 32.35 22.79 -1.99
b17 C 28.38 20.13 0.99 33.96 21.81 -1.25 38.18 25.09 4.92
b20 C 14.14 -1.38 0.64 25.62 14.97 -1.07 18.39 7.76 0.04
b21 C 17.25 3.11 0.27 23.11 8.86 0.76 16.19 -0.06 0.37
b22 C 16.29 5.24 -0.79 29.88 25.32 0.49 19.25 10.71 0.21
Average 17.78 5.27 -0.3 28.31 18.62 -0.36 22.93 11.25 0.55
All cost are in percentage. We use the NanGate 45nm library [43], with synthesis runs
constrained individually to cells relevant for each camouflaging scheme (see Table II).
For a fair comparison, all runs are configured for iso-performance at 5ns.
extent or scale to which camouflaging is applicable at all.
More specifically, most prior arts implement stealthily multiple
Boolean functions within customized gate-level structures, but
these primitives capture typically only some subsets of all the
functionalities needed for modern IC designs. For example,
with the XOR2-NAND2-NOR2 primitive proposed in [7], the
camouflaging scale is inherently constrained (by synthesis)
to the ratio of gates being mapped to XOR2, NAND2, and
NOR2.3 We explore this limitation for selected schemes in
Table II. We note that the limited scales of around 30–40%
camouflaging observed for some schemes are not sufficient
to protect against SAT-based attacks; see also Sec. VI-C for
details. We also note that, as a countermeasure, one may
conduct synthesis with constrained libraries that only provide
the functions covered by the employed camouflaging primi-
tives. Doing so, however, would incur considerable APD cost
over full-library synthesis already for the baseline (Table III),
with actual overheads incurred by the camouflaging primitives
themselves coming further on top.
In short, existing schemes can be applied only selectively—
if at all—due to their impact on FEOL processing steps, their
inherent APD overheads, and their limited scale. As a result,
the constrained application of these and other schemes can
compromise their resilience, as discussed next.
3For FEOL-centric camouflaging, the camouflaging scale would be defined
as the ratio of camouflaged gates over the total number of gates in the layout.
This definition applies for this particular section, and for the discussion of
the prior art throughout this paper. For our BEOL-centric scheme, however,
camouflaging scale is defined as the number of obfuscated nets over the
total number of nets. It is important to note that these two definitions are
compatible; that is because we always obfuscate all the inputs of any gate
selected for camouflaging.
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As mentioned in Sec. I, powerful SAT-based attacks have
challenged most prior art on camouflaging (and logic lock-
ing) [14]–[16]. The idea is that an obfuscated netlist can be
modeled as satisfiability problem, where a working chip copy
is leveraged as an oracle to iteratively revise the model of the
camouflaged netlist, by pruning out step by step any infeasible
assignments for the camouflaged gates. The previously unfore-
seen success of such SAT-based attacks stems from the fact
that typically only a small number of I/O patterns are required
when resolving various camouflaging schemes.
Several studies on provably secure camouflaging (and logic
locking), e.g., see [17]–[19], [44], seek to mitigate SAT-based
attacks by inserting dedicated structures which necessitate con-
sidering an exponential number of I/O patterns. However, the
output signals related to such structures have been identified
successfully, e.g., by signal-probability- or sensitization-driven
algorithms [23], [45], [46]. These critical wires may be ignored
or even cut to circumvent the security features. We note that
wire cutting has been demonstrated in the past [47], enabling
such invasive attacks in principle. Besides, these schemes are
also vulnerable to other algorithmic attacks [20]–[23]. This
is because a key limitation of these schemes is that they
induce low output corruptibility, allowing an attacker to obtain
relatively easily an approximate version of the IP. Note that
this fact also implies that these schemes are less suitable to
protect design IP at the chip scale.
Reverse engineering measures may also render FEOL-
centric camouflaging directly void, without the assistance of
algorithmic techniques. Schemes such as “look-alike” and
ambiguous gates [6], [7], or secretly configured MUXes [8],
[9] rely on dummy contacts or dummy channels. While yet
to be demonstrated, we argue that scanning electron mi-
croscopy in the passive voltage mode (SEM PVC) might break
these schemes. This is because dummy contacts/channels
accumulate charges to a much lower degree than real con-
tacts/channels. Threshold-dependent camouflaging of gates
can also be revealed by SEM PVC, as demonstrated success-
fully by Sugawara et al. [4]. As Collantes et al. [10] indicate
themselves, monitoring the etch rates can also reveal different
doping levels, which are at the heart of their threshold-
dependent gates. Besides, the tailored structures of provably
secure schemes may be relatively easy to identify during
reverse engineering, as these structures are typically applied
only in few places due to their relatively high cost, and they
rely on otherwise uncommon, very large combinatorial trees.
Overall, considering these various limitations and vulnera-
bilities for prior art on FEOL-centric camouflaging, we argue
that alternative approaches are necessary. We believe that such
novel approaches should foremost be large-scale camouflaging
schemes, ideally camouflaging full chips, to 1) remain resilient
as long as foreseeable against any algorithmic attacks, and
2) impose the highest efforts for any physical attacks.
C. Toward Camouflaging at the BEOL
An interesting approach was suggested by Chen et al. [27],
namely to obfuscate the interconnects by implementing real,
conductive vias using magnesium (Mg) along with dummy,
FEOL: made at
untrusted, out-
sourced fab
BEOL: made at
trusted fab, on
top of FEOL
M1
M2
V12
V23
M3
V34
M4
V45
M5
M6
M7
V56
V67
Active
Layer
Contacts
Regular Vias
(Mg or Other
Materials)
Obfuscated Dummy,
Non-Conductive
Vias (MgO)
Obfuscated Real,
Conductive Vias
(Mg)
Fig. 3. Camouflaging at the BEOL implemented along with split
manufacturing—this scheme helps to protect against threats arising from both
fab adversaries and malicious end-users. True, conductive magnesium (Mg)
vias are used in conjunction with dummy, non-conductive magnesium oxide
(MgO) vias. During reverse engineering, the true Mg vias oxidize into MgO
vias, rendering the differentiation of true and dummy vias difficult [27].
non-conductive vias using magnesium oxide (MgO). Chen et
al. elaborated that the use of Mg/MgO is practical from both
the perspectives of (i) manufacturability and (ii) mitigation of
reverse engineering. For (i), they noted that Mg had been used
traditionally to facilitate the bonding of copper interconnects,
and both Mg/MgO are compatible with standard processes,
in particular sputtering, electron-beam evaporation, and Dual-
Damascene. Independently, Swerts et al. [48], [49] and Hwang
et al. [50] have used Mg and MgO for customized BEOL
processes, albeit without camouflaging in mind. For (ii), Chen
et al. fabricated samples and observed that Mg was completely
oxidized into MgO within a few minutes. That is, the real
Mg vias became indistinguishable from the dummy MgO
vias during reverse engineering. Again independently, Hwang
et al. [50] have shown that Mg not only oxidizes but also
dissolves quickly—as does MgO—when surrounded by fluids.
We note that such dissolving would be inevitable for etching
and other reverse-engineering procedures.
Although one can argue that reverse engineering of
Mg/MgO vias is possible nevertheless, this is yet to be demon-
strated. In general, the notion of camouflaging at the BEOL
is not limited to materials currently established for manufac-
turing; future interconnects, e.g., based on carbon/graphene or
spintronics [51], [52], may become relevant as well.
It is important to note that obfuscated interconnects, similar
to FEOL-centric camouflaging, are implemented not only at
the security-enforcing designer’s choice but also at the man-
ufacturer’s discretion. However, obfuscating the interconnects
still allows to limit the dependency on outsourced, potentially
untrustworthy manufacturing facilities, since only the less
complex BEOL part has to remain protected within trusted
facilities. We note that split manufacturing is particularly
promising in this context (Fig. 3).
Finally, another argument for obfuscating the interconnects
is that commercial cost may be compensated for, even when
split manufacturing is applied. This is because one requires
only additional BEOL processing steps, with BEOL masks
being relatively cheap; e.g., for 16nm, M5/M6 masks are
3.5–4× cheaper than Poly masks [53]. In contrast, most
FEOL-centric camouflaging (but not necessarily threshold-
dependent camouflaging) incurs high cost for the additional
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Fig. 4. Our final primitive, with fixed logic values 0 and 1 along with the
real and randomly selected dummy nets. Depending on the gate type, 10 or
14 obfuscated functionalities arise for two-input gates. For this example with
XOR as the underlying gate, we can obfuscate the following 14 functionalities:
0, 1, a, b, w, x, a, b, w, x, a ⊕ b, a ⊕ x, w ⊕ b, and w ⊕ x. Recall that our
concept is generic and directly applicable for any multi-input gates, not only
for two-input gates.
FEOL masks. In general, we would like to recall that FEOL-
centric camouflaging demands some alterations for devices and
their manufacturing process—such alterations are likely more
complex and costly than camouflaging at the BEOL.
Despite their pioneering work, Chen et al. did not provide an
SAT-resilient scheme; see Sec. VI-C. We also emphasize that
our concept and methodology differ significantly from [27];
here, we only leverage their notion of Mg/MgO vias. More-
over, we advocate and enable the obfuscation of interconnects
for large-scale, even full-chip camouflaging, by proposing
dedicated design-time techniques to handle dummy vias and
wires for any gate. In contrast, Chen et al. [27] considered only
small-scale, selected use of additional dummy wires/vias.
III. CONCEPT AND CAMOUFLAGING PRIMITIVE
Our key idea is the following: we leverage reverse-
engineering-resilient and obfuscated interconnects to design
novel, BEOL-centric camouflaging primitives that apply to any
regular gate (Fig. 2). We implement n wires for each input of
the gates to be camouflaged, where n − 1 of those wires are
randomly selected to be acting as dummies, and all n wires
have their vias obfuscated. In other words, we obfuscate the
real inputs of any gate via secret and randomized n:1 mapping
at the BEOL. As a result, the actual function which a gate
implements is obscured in a simple yet effective manner. The
set of possible functionalities depends on n, the selection of
the n wires, and on the gate itself; a representative example
is given in Fig. 4.
We conducted an exploratory, yet thorough, study on dif-
ferent flavors of our camouflaging primitive. We assessed all
flavors when applied at large scales for various benchmarks
by 1) their APD cost, while taking our scheme end-to-end and
evaluating GDSII layouts, and 2) their resilience against SAT-
based attacks while running the seminal attack [15], [31]. The
exploratory study is detailed in [1]; we summarize it next.
We first explored the most basic flavor with two wires for
each gate’s input, i.e., one randomly selected dummy wire
and one real wire. We observed that this flavor offers relatively
weak resilience against SAT-based attacks, even for large-scale
camouflaging. Therefore, we next extended our primitive for
two dummy wires, which provided notably stronger resilience.
However, we also noted considerable APD cost for that flavor,
due to the following. To hinder an attacker from identifying
dummy wires as such, we have to select all the nets for dummy
wires randomly but also such that there are no combinatorial
loops. Furthermore, dummy wires have to be driven by unique
nets, as otherwise some of the possible functionalities could
be ruled out directly. These requirements translated to signifi-
cantly increased routing congestion in practice and, in turn,
higher power consumption and delays. Therefore, we note
that the use of dummy wires should be limited for large-scale
applicability of our scheme. Finally, we explored an extended
flavor comprising fixed logic values 0 and 1 along with regular
nets (Fig. 4). When compared to employing only regular nets,
the benefit of using fixed-value nets is that the latter are not
switching, thus exhibiting only negligible power consumption
and imposing no timing overhead. Also, many of these wires
can have the same driver (but not all, see Sec. V-A), which
helped to reduce the routing congestion. Regarding SAT-based
attacks, we observed that this flavor provides good resilience.
In short, we select the flavor exemplified in Fig. 4 for the
remainder of our study, as we found empirically that it offers
the best security-cost trade-off [1].
Since our concept is based on camouflaging at the BEOL,
it can be readily applied in conjunction with split manufac-
turing (Sec. II-A). To that end, we tailor our camouflaging
primitive initially for higher metal layers, namely for M5
and M6 (Sec. V-C). We do so because split manufacturing
is considered more practical for higher layers [41], [54], as
those layers have rather large pitches, which are relatively
easy and cheap to manufacture by the BEOL facility. We also
explore our camouflaging primitive when tailored for lower
metal layers (i.e., M3 and M4 in this work), and we support
both types of primitives holistically in our flow (Sec. V-B).
IV. THREAT MODEL
We assume both the end-users and the fab to be untrusted.
The latter is in direct contrast to the prior art on camouflaging
that has to trust the fab because of their FEOL-centric tech-
niques. To hinder fab adversaries, i.e., to protect the secret
dummy/true vias and wires in the BEOL layers, we leverage
split manufacturing; therefore, we require a trusted BEOL
facility.4 The goal of malicious end-users is to reverse engineer
the chip’s layout and identify its secret mappings in the BEOL
layers—recall that the latter is challenging and yet to be
demonstrated (Sec. II-C). Ultimately, both malicious end-users
and fab adversaries want to reconstruct the original netlist and
its IP. To that end, we assume that end-users employ SAT-
based attacks, whereas fab workers launch proximity attacks.
We evaluate both threat scenarios in Sec. VI-C and VI-D.
We assume that malicious end-users can get hold of working
chips, which are used (i) as oracle for iterative SAT-based
attack, and (ii) for reverse engineering of the chip’s layout (as
required to model the obfuscated netlist as an SAT problem),
but end-users cannot directly infer the secret BEOL mappings.
We assume that malicious fab workers have access to the
FEOL layers, but not to the BEOL layers. We further assume
that both end-users and fab workers have the complete know-
how of our scheme, the used design tools, etc. However,
the adversaries cannot, by nature, reproduce the randomized
selection steps taken throughout our scheme.
4 In a weaker threat model where the fab is trusted, our scheme and its
primitives can still be applied as is, just without need for split manufacturing.
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Fig. 5. An inverter transformed into a two-input NAND gate. The real
nets/wires are underlined and shown in red.
V. CAMOUFLAGING METHODOLOGY
A. Protecting Fixed Values and “Implausible Functionalities”
For large-scale camouflaging using our primitive (Fig. 4),
we note that the ubiquitous wires relating to fixed values 0 and
1 may give away clues to an attacker. Such fixed-value wires
would be driven by distinct, easy-to-identify TIE cells, and
such cells and wires are typically used only selectively, e.g.,
for special registers or “hardware feature flags.” Therefore, an
attacker observing a vast number of fixed-value wires might
rightfully assume that these wires have been introduced only
for obfuscation, and could try to disregard them. Besides, we
have to address another challenge at once: a mindful attacker
may also try to rule out all the “implausible functionalities”
which are those beyond any gate’s original functionality, i.e.,
inverter, buffer, and TIE cells, from the search space. Since
these functionalities arise only due to the fixed values being
part of the obfuscated inputs, they can only become effective
once the fixed values are made an essential part of the design,
and vice versa.
In short, the fixed-value wires have to be rendered essential
parts of the layout, while also protecting all the “implausible
functionalities,” of gates. To do so, we perform netlist trans-
formations at the beginning of our methodology as follows:
1) We transform selected inverters (INVs) and buffers
(BUFs) into camouflaged gates of other types (e.g., see
Fig. 5). Nowadays, around 50% of all gates are repeaters
using INV/BUF [55], offering ample opportunities for
related transformations. One can freely choose (i) the
number of INVs/BUFs to transform and (ii) the type of
gate to transform them into following Boolean algebra.
For a standard library, for example, INV (BUF) can be
implemented using NAND (AND), NOR (OR), as well
as both XOR and XNOR, all while using the fixed-
value wires as one of the real inputs for those gates.
This step renders the fixed-value wires essential—they
cannot be ignored anymore without misinterpreting those
transformed, camouflaged gates and, therefore, without
misinterpreting the whole design. We also note that
the “implausible functionalities” INV and BUF are now
rendered plausible for the design and, independently, an
attacker cannot simply infer a direct relationship between
any of the camouflaged gates and their true functionality.
2) We insert additional gates of randomly selected types
into randomly selected regions of whitespace. These addi-
tional gates are camouflaged as well, with their real inputs
tied to fixed-value wires. These gates act as “TIE cells
in disguise” and, in turn, they seemingly “drive” other
camouflaged gates, which are randomly selected from the
vicinity. Therefore, also the “implausible functionalities”
0 and 1 cannot be ruled out anymore without misinterpret-
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Fig. 6. Flow of our layout-level, BEOL-centric camouflaging methodology.
ing the design. As with the transformation of INV/BUF
above, leveraging randomness here is essential to hinder
attackers from simply inferring these camouflaged gates.
B. CAD Flow
Here we provide an overview of our methodology (Fig. 6),
which can be easily integrated into any design flow. In this
work, we implement our methodology for Cadence Innovus.
Given a netlist, we initially synthesize, place, and route
the design. On this original layout, we then apply our netlist
transformations outlined above, along with the insertion of TIE
cells. Recall that, for our scheme, we define camouflaging
scale, or LC scale for short, as the ratio of obfuscated nets
over all the nets. Also recall that this is directly comparable
to the ratio of camouflaged gates over all the gates, as we
always obfuscate all the input nets of any gate selected for
camouflaging. Next, depending on the camouflaging scale, we
prepare for camouflaging in lower and higher metal layers,
e.g., 30% camouflaging in lower layers and 70% camouflaging
in higher layers for an camouflaging scale of 100% overall.
That so-called metal-layer ratio for lower/higher layers and
the camouflaging scale are provided by the user. Then we
randomly assign nets to be camouflaged at lower/higher layers,
subject to these two parameters.
Next, we insert and connect individual obfuscating cells for
all the inputs of each gate to be camouflaged—these cells
are essentially implementing our camouflaging primitives. It
is essential to understand that these customized obfuscating
cells do not impact the FEOL layers—their sole purpose is
to enable the routing of all dummy and real wires (Fig. 7).
Hence, the physical design of these customized cells is tailored
for routability, while their arrangement remains flexible and
unconfined concerning the already placed standard cells. See
Sec. V-C for more details on the physical design, and see Fig. 8
for a layout snapshot of multiple obfuscating cells in M5/M6.
As already indicated in Sec. III, we have to choose dummy
nets carefully such that they are unique concerning each gate to
be camouflaged. We do so by applying a local spatial search
around each gate’s inputs; nearby nets/wires are preferably
selected to limit the routing congestion. We also check for
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Fig. 7. Wiring and vias for our obfuscating cell implementing the BEOL-
centric camouflaging in M5/M6. Conceptional view in (a) and post-processed
Innovus layout snapshot in (b). The dummy/real vias are indicated as red
crosses/green circle in (a) and are colored in orange/green in (b). In this
example, the real input net is labeled as a in (a). In (b), the incoming wire for
net a connects to pin C, whereas the outgoing wire connects to pin Y and from
there to the input pin of the camouflaged gate (not illustrated). The pins A, B,
and Y reside in M6 (orange, vertical wiring), whereas pins C and D are set up
in M5 (red, horizontal wiring). Note that the actual wiring depends on which
vias are dummy and which are real; illustrated is one possible configuration.
Fig. 8. Innovus snapshot of multiple obfuscation cells, along with standard
cells. Colors are inverted, only M5/M6 layers are turned on, and the outlines
for obfuscation cells are turned off, all for visibility.
combinatorial loops, which may have resulted during that
process and re-select dummy nets as required.
After embedding and connecting the obfuscating cells, we
perform trial routing—now with all the dummy wires along
with the real wires—and we evaluate the congestion. In case of
excessive congestion, the user is tasked to revise (i) the metal-
layer ratio and, if need be, (ii) the die outline. Regarding (i), we
advocate to revise it toward more utilization of higher layers
and less utilization of lower layers for the following reasons.
First, we note that lower layers tend to become more utilized
in any case, even when obfuscating cells are assigned to higher
layers. That is because the related dummy wires can also incur
additional wiring throughout the lower layers. Second, we note
that obfuscating cells and their vias inserted into the lower
layers tend to require even more resources. Regarding (ii), in
case congestion remains after exploring various metal-layer
ratios, we advocate to enlarge the die outline carefully to gain
more routing resources.5
Once we obtain an uncongested solution, we perform le-
galization and ECO optimization; the latter is also based on
custom constraint rules, see Sec. V-C. At the same time,
5An alternative to gain routing resources is to employ additional metal
layers, which may also be more economical than enlarging die outlines [41].
FEOL
BEOLcw1
cw2
cp2
cp1
Fig. 9. The capacitance cp1 for any input pin of an obfuscating cell is
annotated such that it equals the wire capacitance cw2 and the camouflaged
gate’s input-pin capacitance cp2.
we also re-route the design. Drivers are automatically up-
scaled as needed to effectively/seemingly drive all the ad-
ditional true/dummy wiring and the increased fanouts; see
also Sec. V-C. We perform final design closure, remove the
obfuscating cells from the design, re-extract the RC data,
stream out the GDSII data, and gather the final APD/PPA
numbers. Note that, after removal of the obfuscating cells, all
the true/dummy vias and related wiring remain as such in place
of those cells. Thus, the final APD/PPA numbers represent the
nature of the camouflaged layout accurately.
C. Physical Design of Obfuscating Cells
We implement the obfuscating cells as customized cells,
which only pertain to the BEOL. To that end, and without loss
of generality, we extend the LIB/LEF files of the NanGate
45nm Open Cell Library [43]. Next, we elaborate on the
crucial aspects of the cells’ physical design. Besides the design
described here for metal layers M5/M6, we also implemented
obfuscating cells for M3/M4 in a similar manner.
1) The cells have four input and one output pin (Fig. 7(b)).
These pins have been set up in two metal layers: pins A,
B, and Y reside in M6, whereas pins C and D are set up
in M5. We have chosen two different layers to minimize
the routing congestion—in exploratory experiments with
all pins in M6, we observed overly high congestion,
especially for camouflaging scales beyond 50%.
2) The dimensions of the pins (0.14 × 0.14µm) and their
offsets are chosen such that the pins can be placed directly
on the respective layer’s tracks (thin yellow grid in
Fig. 7(b)); this is to minimize routing congestion further.
Also, note the cell’s grey outline beneath the pins; the
pins are partially located outside the outline, which is
supported. The minimal width is solely to ease its visual
differentiation from standard cells at design time.
3) We define custom constraint rules which prevent the pins
of different obfuscating cells from overlapping during
legalization. These obfuscating cells can, however, freely
overlap with any standard cell without inducing routing
conflicts. This is because standard cells have their pins
exclusively in the lower metal layers. Therefore, we
can camouflage the entire design without blocking any
valuable standard-cell area.
4) We leverage the timing and power characteristics of
BUFX2, i.e., a buffer with a driving strength of 2. Note
that a detailed library characterization is not required
as obfuscating cells implement BEOL wires and vias
only. However, since obfuscating cells are essentially
interposed within the paths, a capacitance annotation of
subsequent loads is crucial (Fig. 9). Without such anno-
tation, the respective driver might become undersized, as
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TABLE IV
RUNTIME, IN SECONDS, FOR OUR CAMOUFLAGING CAD PROCEDURES
Benchmark Original 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%LC Scale LC Scale LC Scale LC Scale LC Scale
aes core 498 1,323 2,469 2,102 3,075 4,019
b14 C 178 217 258 313 403 527
b15 C 256 316 376 445 514 639
b17 C 603 901 2,497 2,640 2,930 4,378
b22 C 428 573 1,105 1,771 2,221 3,652
diffeq1 530 819 1,576 2,733 4,349 6,256
square 451 787 1,964 2,118 4,606 5,343
Average 420.57 705.14 1,463.57 1,731.71 2,385.43 3,544.86
Benchmarks in italics are from the EPFL suite [56], others are from the ITC-99 suite.
ECO optimization would only consider the wire routed
from the driver toward the obfuscating cell and the latter’s
BUFX2 input load, but not the camouflaged gate actually
to be driven, which is “masked” by the obfuscating cell.
It is important to note that this annotation is to be applied
for true nets as well as for dummy nets. Otherwise,
dummy nets might be identified as such by possibly
undersized drivers.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
A. Setup
Setup for physical design: We implement our methodol-
ogy as custom TCL scripts for Cadence Innovus 16.15. Our
procedures incur some runtime costs, as presented in Table IV.
We employ the public NanGate 45nm Open Cell Li-
brary [43] with ten metal layers. Synthesis is performed using
Synopsys Design Compiler (DC) for the slow process corner.
The APD analysis is carried out for 0.95V, 125◦C, and the slow
process corner, along with a default input switching activity of
0.2—this is a rather pessimistic setup, providing conservative
results with “safety margins” and “room for lowering cost.” We
obtain power and timing results using Innovus. We configure
the initial utilization rates, i.e., for the original layouts, such
that the routing congestion remains close to 0%.
Recall that we implement the obfuscation cells as cus-
tomized cells in two versions, one for higher layers in M5/M6,
and one for lower layers in M3/M4. Unless stated other-
wise, results are obtained with obfuscating cells embedded
exclusively in M5/M6. For experiments with both higher and
lower layers being used, we start with only lower layers being
utilized, and revise that ratio, without loss of generality and
for the sake of simplicity, in steps of 1% toward higher layers.
Setup for security evaluation: We model ours as well
as all camouflaging techniques proposed in [7]–[9], [11],
as outlined in [16]. More specifically, we model ours as
individual 4-to-1 MUXes for all the inputs of each gate to be
camouflaged, with all the related dummy/true wires connected
to the MUXes’ inputs and with two select/key signals. For
the netlist transformation steps explained in Sec. V-A, we
select 50% of all INVs/BUFs randomly and transform them
into various camouflaged gates randomly and the remaining
INVs/BUFs are camouflaged as is; both selections are also
subject to the overall camouflaging scale.
For a fair evaluation, the same sets of gates are camouflaged
across all camouflaging techniques: for a given benchmark,
gates are randomly selected once and then memorized.6 Ten
different sets are generated for each benchmark, ranging from
10% to 100% camouflaging scale, in steps of 10%.
For the scenario of malicious end-users, we evaluate our
scheme against powerful SAT-based attacks [15], [21], [31],
[32] in Sec. VI-C. We note that these attacks were developed
for logic locking but are still applicable for our study—
logic locking and camouflaging are closely related and can be
transformed into one another [16]. We attribute the average
runtime of the attacks as an empirical, yet essential, indicator
for a design’s resilience; see also the discussion on the notion
of practically secure camouflaging in Sec. VI-C.
For the scenario of malicious fab employees, we evaluate
our scheme against the powerful open-source proximity at-
tacks [33], [35] and [34], [36] in Sec. VI-D. We conduct
experiments for layouts being split after M3 and M4, re-
spectively, which helps us to evaluate the significance of the
split layer for our scheme. For [33], [35], we leverage the
commonly applied metrics of correct connection rate (CCR),
i.e., the ratio of correctly inferred BEOL connections over total
BEOL connections, and Hamming distance (HD) and output
error rate (OER) [41]; the latter both quantify the functional
correctness of the inferred netlist. HD and OER are computed
using Synopsys VCS using 100,000 patterns. For [34], [36],
since it does not provide any actual netlists, these metrics are
not applicable; instead, we leverage the metrics defined in [36],
namely virtual pins (vpins), E[LS], and figure of merit (FOM).7
All attacks are executed on a high-performance computing
(HPC) facility. Each computational node has two 14-core Intel
Broadwell processors (Xeon E5-2680), running at 2.4 GHz.
Each node has 128 GB RAM in total, and 4 GB RAM are
guaranteed (by the Slurm HPC scheduler) for each attack run.
The CPU time-out (labeled as “t-o”) is set to 48 hours.
Benchmarks: We conduct extensive experiments on tra-
ditional benchmarks suites (ISCAS-85 and ITC-99) and, for
the first time, also on the large-scale EPFL suite [56] (using
the original circuits, not the MIG versions). Note that all
benchmarks are combinatorial, but our approach can be di-
rectly applied to sequential designs as well. We employ custom
scripts to convert (i) the original netlists to bench format with
two-input gates, as required for the SAT-based attack [15],
[31], and (ii) the post-layout netlists to rt and out format, as
required for the proximity attack [34], [36]. We release the
scripts for (ii) and other related materials in [57].
6Any other technique such as maximum clique [7] could be applied here as
well. However, El Massad et al. [14] observed that maximum-clique selection,
on average, cannot offer a better resilience than random selection.
7The term vpin or virtual pin refers to the top-most, open, or “dangling”
end of a FEOL wire, which is a hint for an adversary that a via would be
placed there to connect the FEOL with the undisclosed BEOL. By definition,
[34], [36] considers only vpins related to two-pin nets. E[LS] is the number
of candidate vpins to match with other vpins over a specific region, i.e., the
number of possible pairings in the vicinity of some missing BEOL connection.
FOM represents the number of possible pairings normalized over the area of
the specific region considered. Thus, when applied step wise across the FEOL
layout and averaged, FOM serves to quantify the complexity of exploring
all possible BEOL connections. Since the attack [34], [36] does not recover
any actual netlists, these metrics are essentially indicators for the complexity
imposed on subsequent, yet-to-be-proposed attack steps to infer such netlists.
PATNAIK et al.: OBFUSCATING THE INTERCONNECTS: LOW-COST AND RESILIENT FULL-CHIP LAYOUT CAMOUFLAGING 9
TABLE V
OUR POST-LAYOUT, GDSII-LEVEL LAYOUT COST
Benchmark Utilization for 20% LC Scale 40% LC Scale 60% LC Scale 80% LC Scale 100% LC ScaleOriginal Layout Area Power Delay Area Power Delay Area Power Delay Area Power Delay Area Power Delay
aes core 0.4 0 9.02 21.35 0 13.49 27.46 14.29 15.44 29.72 25 20.22 30.94 33.33 27.76 35.72
b14 C 0.5 0 6.43 3.64 0 9.88 5.01 11.11 16.92 9.75 19.04 21.39 8.74 19.04 38.46 14.76
b15 C 0.5 0 10.78 7.45 0 11.19 10.14 11.11 14.39 11.45 25 17.27 15.74 25 28.78 20.77
b17 C 0.5 11.11 7.16 7.19 19.04 11.13 11.22 25 16.93 14.64 42.85 17.14 14.21 42.85 28.29 16.92
b22 C 0.5 0 7.24 11.41 0 13.11 14.37 11.11 15.11 14.81 19.04 25.27 15.11 25 37.48 22.41
diffeq1 0.5 0 5.78 3.61 0 10.64 6.54 11.11 15.87 8.49 11.11 24.19 16.79 25 31.23 28.75
square 0.5 0 8.19 7.14 11.11 9.98 13.06 11.11 13.21 11.47 19.04 18.3 16.42 25 25.15 22.45
Average 0.5 1.59 7.8 8.83 4.31 11.35 12.54 13.55 15.41 14.33 23.01 20.54 16.85 27.89 31.02 23.11
Layout cost are in percentage. Obfuscating cells are embedded exclusively in M5/M6. Benchmarks in italics are from the EPFL suite [56], others are from the ITC-99 suite. All
layouts are DRC-clean and devoid of congestion.
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Fig. 10. Layout cost for EPFL benchmark aes core [56]. The baseline is the
original, unprotected layout. The discrete and monotonous area cost is due to
a step-wise up-scaling of die outlines as needed; see text below.
B. Layout Evaluation
We first report in detail on APD cost for our scheme, and we
then compare ours to various prior works. Figure 10 illustrates
our cost, along with wirelength and load capacitance, for the
EPFL benchmark aes core [56]. Table V reports our cost for
this and other selected benchmarks. Note that we consider
further benchmarks as well, for various other experiments,
throughout this section. Recall that results are in general
obtained with obfuscating cells embedded only in M5/M6; in
Table VI, we also provide results for obfuscation cells being
embedded in M5/M6 and M3/M4 at once.
On die area: Recall that our obfuscating cells impact only
the metal layers; they do not increase the standard-cell area.
Since wiring cannot be expressed by standard-cell area, the
reported area cost is concerning die outlines as explained next.
Especially for large-scale camouflaging, with the additional
wiring imposed by our scheme requiring significant routing
resources, we can observe routing congestion and DRC issues.
Recall that we first revise the metal-layer ratio, e.g., see
Fig. 11, and, if need be, scale-up die outlines. In other
words, we ultimately maintain that our large-scale camou-
flaged layouts are “DRC-clean” at the cost of larger outlines.
For simplicity, we scale-up the outlines by decreasing the
utilization rate in steps of 0.05 and 0.02, as appropriate. For
example, while relaxing the utilization from 0.5 to 0.45, the
die area has to be increased by 11.11%.
TABLE VI
OUR POWER (P), DELAY (D) COST FOR CAMOUFLAGING ONLY IN
M5/M6 (H) VERSUS CAMOUFLAGING IN M3/M4 AND M5/M6 (L&H)
LC Scale b14 C H b14 C L&H b15 C H b15 C L&HP D P D L/H P D P D L/H
20% 6.43 3.64 0.87 -1.08 15/5 10.78 7.45 2.94 1.46 15/5
40% 9.88 5.01 2.17 1.99 10/30 11.19 10.14 9.43 5.94 15/25
60% 16.92 9.75 16.12 7.18 20/40 14.39 11.45 11.75 9.98 20/40
80% 21.39 8.74 14.27 8.24 30/50 17.27 15.74 13.68 12.22 20/60
100% 38.46 14.76 19.91 18.76 30/70 28.78 20.77 16.99 17.29 20/80
Average 18.62 8.38 10.67 7.02 – 16.48 13.11 10.96 9.38 –
Layout cost and metal-layer ratios (L/H) are in percentage, with the latter being subject
to the camouflaging scale (LC). For a fair comparison, the same die outlines are
considered for both the H and L&H setups. Note that the cost for the H setup are the
same as in Table V.
(a) (b)
Fig. 11. Innovus snapshots for full-chip camouflaging of ITC-99 b15 C. For
visibility, colors are inverted. (a) Camouflaging is implemented as 30%/70%
in lower/higher layers, resulting in around 10,000 DRC issues (marked by
crosses). (b) For the same die outline, camouflaging is implemented as
20%/80% in lower/higher layers, resulting in a DRC-clean layout. For (a),
total over-congestion is reported as 10.4%, with worst gcell over-congestion
of 12.71%, whereas for (b), these metrics are 0.19% and 0.43%.
The average area overheads in Table V are not more than
14% for up to 60% camouflaging scale, whereas for full-chip
camouflaging, we note an average area cost close to 28%.
Again, these overheads enable DRC-clean layouts even for
full-chip camouflaging; we believe that this is a justifiable cost.
Finally, while the transformation of 50% of INV/BUF gates
and the insertion of “TIE cells in disguise“ both still incur
some standard-cell area cost, this cost is negligible compared
to the die cost related to all the additional wiring. In fact, we
have conducted additional experiments for full-chip camou-
flaging of the large-scale EPFL benchmark aes core [56] for
ranges of 25–100% of INVs/BUFs selected for transformation;
we did not observe any additional die costs there.
10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 12. Innovus snapshots of metal layers M5 and M6 for EPFL benchmark aes core [56] for (a) the original layout (i.e., 0% LC scale), (b) 20% LC scale,
(c) 60% LC scale, and (d) 100% LC scale. Obfuscating cells are embedded exclusively in M5/M6. Colors are inverted for visibility.
On power and performance: As our camouflaging primi-
tive incurs additional wiring, which becomes significant for
large-scale camouflaging, an impact on power and perfor-
mance is expected. See also Fig. 12 for wiring snapshots across
camouflaging ranges.
For camouflaging up until 60% of the layout, the average
power and delay overheads are moderate for most benchmarks,
around 6–17% for power and 4–15% for delay (Table V).
Only for EPFL benchmark aes core, delays are consistently
larger, by approximately 15%. The overheads increase nat-
urally toward full-chip camouflaging, but still follow linear
growth trends. We believe that this is due to the following:
1) Besides the transformed INV/BUF gates, all gates remain
as is. Even for these transformed gates, cost are lim-
ited: for experiments on varying ranges of INVs/BUFs
transformed for full-chip camouflaging of the large-scale
EPFL benchmark aes core [56], we observed variations
for power and performance cost of less than 9%. That is,
we experience no inherent overheads for the majority of
gates and marginal overheads for transformed gates.
2) The lower resistance of higher metal layers, which are
typically leveraged by most of the obfuscating-cell in-
stances, helps to limit the delay cost.
3) The nets for fixed-values 0 and 1 are not switching and,
thus, they neither increase power nor delay. Also, while
dummy nets are switching, they drive only wiring loads.
4) For large-scale camouflaging, the positive effects are
eventually offset by a steady increase of dummy nets
and wiring for camouflaged gates, thereby raising the ca-
pacitive loads and power consumption as well as routing
congestion. Since congestion can only be managed by re-
routing in some detours, this lengthens parts of the wires
further. In turn, this also impacts power and delay.
Regarding the use of obfuscating cells in both lower and
higher metal layers (Table VI), we observe the following. First,
utilizing lower and higher layers at once (L&H setup) allows
to reduce cost, especially for power—in contrast to utilizing
only the higher layers (H setup), we observe a reduction of
7.95% and 5.52% in power for the ITC-99 benchmarks b14 C
and b15 C, respectively, and the delay reduction is 1.36%
and 3.73% for the same benchmarks. To explain these trends,
we also determine the load capacitance overheads for both
setups: for the H setup, the capacitance overhead is about
62.78%, whereas this overhead is reduced to 29.99% for the
L&H setup. Second, for large-scale camouflaging, the usability
of lower layers becomes less; recall the related discussion
in Sec. V-B. Finally, recall that splitting at higher layers is
considered beneficial [41], [54], but here we cannot split above
the lowest layer containing some camouflaging primitives.
Therefore, while the holistic use of lower and higher layers
can help to reduce layout cost, it limits the practicality of split
manufacturing. For a weaker threat model with the fab being
trusted, however, this approach would become more relevant.
Comparison at RTL level and for small-scale camouflag-
ing: Previous works typically report their cost only for small-
scale camouflaging and based on RTL simulations, which
seems impractical. For example, Rajendran et al. [7] observe
≈60%, ≈40%, and ≈30% increase in area, power, and delay,
respectively, when camouflaging 5% of gates in the ISCAS-85
benchmark c7552. The approach of Wang et al. [8] exhibits
50% delay and 15% area overhead already for 5% camouflag-
ing scale. For another, more relevant example, Chen et al. [27]
report 3.68% delay and 3.93% area overhead on average, i.e.,
when configuring their scheme for 3% power budget/overhead
and while obfuscating only tens to few hundreds of wires for
the ITC-99 benchmarks.
Comparison on physical-layout level: Recall that our work
is one of the very few to evaluate camouflaging on placed-and-
routed GDSII layouts. When contrasting to a previous study,
conducted by Malik et al. [58], we notice significantly higher
overheads for them. We note that Malik et al. implement
and evaluate their approach exclusively for one AES S-box,
which has a far lower number of gates, namely 421, when
compared to all the benchmarks we consider. However, we
argue that a qualitative comparison is still fair as Malik et al.
use the same NanGate library [43]. They reported overheads
of 7.09×, 6.45×, and 3.12× for area, power, and delay (APD),
respectively, for their case study. Moreover, Malik et al.
indicate themselves that cost will increase for larger circuits.
Besides a provably secure scheme, Li et al. [17] propose two
“regular” camouflaging primitives (based on obfuscated con-
tacts), called STF-type and XOR-type. As Li et al. report only
gate-level cost for their primitives, we conduct a layout-level
comparison for full-chip camouflaging ourselves (Table VII).
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TABLE VII
AREA (A), POWER (P), AND DELAY (D) FOR FULL-CHIP CAMOUFLAGING
Bench- XOR-type [17] STF-type [17] Threshold [12] Ours
mark A P D A P D A P D A P D
c432 66.48 11.43 42.2 54.31 20.37 6.4 140 8 96 27.27 25.46 15.41
c5315 92.33 33.81 50.56 62.18 38.31 7.29 200 10 76 50 10.19 9.94
c7552 80.86 58.94 29.64 62.53 63.42 14.86 175 9 90 33.33 17.01 14.09
b14 C 40.43 -5.41 41.6 42.23 13.11 22.9 N/A N/A N/A 19.04 38.46 14.76
b15 C 67.07 16.36 37.13 65.4 30.77 19.54 N/A N/A N/A 25 28.78 20.77
b17 C 71.40 25.12 55.97 59.91 11.99 14.39 N/A N/A N/A 42.85 28.29 16.92
b22 C 46.37 7.67 47.65 43.09 25.17 25.87 N/A N/A N/A 25 37.48 22.41
Average 66.42 21.13 43.54 55.66 29.02 15.89 171.67 9 87.33 31.78 26.52 16.33
We consider selected ISCAS-85 and ITC-99 benchmarks, as done in the listed prior art.
All layout cost are in percentage. We evaluate cost for [17] ourselves, while
constraining synthesis and applying a linear scaling of baseline camouflaging primitives
cost, reported in [17], capturing all gates. Cost for [12] are quoted. N/A means not
available, i.e., the respective authors did not consider that benchmark.
Here we first constrain synthesis accordingly (recall Sec. II-B),
and then we map their gate-level cost to all the gates—this
extrapolation is conservative as it implies only a linear scaling
even for full-chip camouflaging. While the STF-type primitive
becomes a contender to ours in terms of power and delays, it
still incurs 23.88% larger die-area cost on average.
For Zhang’s work [9], as its MUX-based primitive is not
made available, we implement it ourselves, by using MUXes
and INVs for the primitives, and primary inputs for their key
bits, and we perform a detailed layout-level evaluation. For
example, we observe 464%, 638%, and 63% increase for APD,
respectively, when camouflaging all the gates for the ISCAS-
85 benchmark c7552. These numbers are 13.92×, 37.51×, and
4.47× higher than ours for the same scenario.
On average, across all ISCAS-85, ITC-99, and EPFL bench-
marks, our scheme incurs only 32.55%, 24.96%, and 19.06%
APD cost for full-chip camouflaging.
Comparison with threshold-dependent camouflaging:
Nirmala et al. [11] proposed a promising concept of threshold-
dependent camouflaging switches. Since their primitive and
related libraries are not made available, we apply our own
layout-level evaluation as follows. First, we conduct a con-
strained synthesis run (recall Sec. II-B) using the NanGate
library [43]. Then, based on the overhead numbers reported
for their primitive, we scale up the cost accordingly for
all the camouflaged gate instances. Again, while this is an
extrapolating approach, we argue that it is fair, as we reflect
truthfully the different overheads for different types of gates
camouflaged. We find that the approach by Nirmala et al.
will incur significant APD cost for full-chip camouflaging:
≈1,360%, ≈1,266%, and ≈100%, respectively. For the work
of Collantes et al. [10], we observe a linear trend in the
reported layout cost; simply extrapolating those numbers for
full-chip camouflaging would translate to ≈78% and ≈147%
for power and delay, respectively. Finally, for the work of
Erbagci et al. [12], we quote their numbers in Table VII.
Comparison with provably secure camouflaging: Recall
that schemes like [17]–[19] rely on additional circuitry to
protect individual, selected gates, wires, or outputs. Such
circuitry can incur a high cost, especially for area and power.
Using the benchmarks provided by Amir et al. [59] on trust-
hub.org, we conduct a layout-level analysis for Anti-SAT [19],
namely for Anti-SAT with random logic locking (RLL) and for
TABLE VIII
COMPARISON OF LAYOUT-LEVEL COST WITH Anti-SAT [19], [59], [60]
ON SELECTED ISCAS-85 BENCHMARKS
Benchmark Anti-SAT+RLL Anti-SAT+SLL OursA P D A P D A P D
c880 588.48 678.13 5.29 568.42 618.15 7.89 27.27 23.28 19.63
c1355 480.15 410.09 16.45 500.44 418.83 16.13 40 9.48 11.62
c1908 479.06 526.91 2.74 552.91 644.49 3.82 40 21.11 16.46
c3540 193.87 162.05 0.92 290.07 335.75 0.31 50 10.34 10.24
c5315 230.15 212.91 2.08 224.59 193.83 0.65 50 10.19 9.94
c7552 182.22 173.21 -4.42 170.92 170.64 -4.83 33.33 17.01 14.09
Average 358.99 360.55 3.84 384.56 396.95 3.99 40.1 15.24 13.66
All layout cost are in percentage. We use trust-hub.org benchmarks [59] as follows.
For Anti-SAT+RLL, we use c880-NR4360, c1355-NR3790, c1908-NR3550,
c3540-NR4060, c5315-NR7900, and c7552-NR8770. For Anti-SAT+SLL, we use
c880-NS4360, c1355-NS3790, c1908-NS3550, c3540-NS4060, c5315-NS7900, and
c7552-NS8770. All protected designs are configured for iso-performance at 4ns.
TABLE IX
COMPARISON OF LAYOUT-LEVEL COST WITH BDD-Based
OBFUSCATION [22], [59] ON SELECTED ISCAS-85 BENCHMARKS
Benchmark Random Obfus. Anti-SAT Obfus. OursA P D A P D A P D
c880 5,166.86 6,351.69 8.14 5,289.19 6,536.58 9.44 27.27 23.28 19.63
c1908 5,727.6 5,973.24 1.96 7,078.33 7,349.63 2.74 40 21.11 16.46
c3540 2,803.79 2,111.32 1.76 2,807.78 2,119.05 2.32 50 10.34 10.24
c5315 76.89 45.49 7.26 51.63 39.59 6.67 50 10.19 9.94
c7552 109.30 63.49 0.81 133.57 97.04 -0.33 33.33 17.01 14.09
Average 3,706.84 4,040.95 4.72 3,072.1 3,228.38 4.17 40.12 16.38 14.07
All layout cost are in percentage. We use trust-hub.org benchmarks [59] as follows. For
Random Obfus. we use c880-BR320, c1908-BR320, c3540-BR320, c5315-BR320, and
c7552-BR320. For Anti-SAT Obfus. we use c880-BS320, c1908-BS320, c3540-BS320,
c5315-BS320, and c7552-BS320. Note that trust-hub.org [59] does not provide the
related c1355 circuits. All protected designs are configured for iso-performance at 4ns.
Anti-SAT with secure logic locking (SLL) [60].8 We perform a
regular design flow here, using the Nangate 45nm library [43]
at the slow corner and with timing constrained to 4ns. When
comparing these schemes to our full-chip camouflaging (Ta-
ble VIII), we observe that average overheads are notably larger,
namely by 8.95× and 9.59× for area and by 23.66× and
26.05× for power, respectively; only delay overheads are less.
We note that these cost arise for protecting single outputs and
increase further if we would protect more outputs.
In any case, we emphasize again that our notion of full-
chip camouflaging is different from such schemes (including
functional obfuscation [22] discussed next), see also on the
notion of practically secure camouflaging further below.
Comparison with functional obfuscation: Xu et al. [22]
proposed binary decision diagram (BDD)-based obfuscation
which operates at the functional level, in contrast to other
approaches working at the netlist level. It was shown that
their scheme can be tailored to remain resilient against SAT-
based attacks as well “removal attacks” [22], [23]. As above,
we evaluate two approaches of [22] at layout level, namely
random obfuscation and Anti-SAT-inspired obfuscation [59].
Again, expect for delay, we observe that average overheads
are significantly larger, namely by 92.39× and 76.57× for area
and 197.1× and 246.7× for power, respectively (Table IX).
8Recall that locking and camouflaging are interchangeable, especially w.r.t.
SAT-based attacks [16], rendering this analysis relevant for our work.
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Fig. 13. Average runtimes of [15], [31] for aes core, sampled over 70
different sets of randomly gates being camouflaged across the plotted range.
C. Security Evaluation: Malicious End-Users, SAT-Based At-
tacks
On the notion of practically secure camouflaging: Recall
that the primary objective for this work is large-scale cam-
ouflaging, and an important observation is that this achieves
practically secure camouflaging. That is, by camouflaging up
to 100% of the layout, we can induce significant computational
efforts for SAT-based attacks, without leveraging additional
provably secure structures.
Still, it is not straightforward to prove beforehand to what
extent large-scale camouflaging will render a layout resilient
without actually leveraging a SAT solver’s capabilities for
de-camouflaging attacks. Li et al. [17] have shown that de-
camouflaging efforts scale on average with (i) the solution
space C concerning all possible functionalities of the whole
design and (ii) the Hamming distances among those different
functionalities. A further theoretical evaluation of large-scale
camouflaging is difficult since C depends on (i) the number
and composition of possible functionalities supported by the
camouflaging primitives, (ii) the number of camouflaged gates,
(iii) the selection of camouflaged gates, and (iv) the intercon-
nectivity of the design, all at the same time. For example,
designs containing XOR/XNOR and/or multipliers are harder
to de-camouflage in practice than other designs [15], [16].
In short, while one can easily estimate the upper bound
of C, this may not reflect on the actual efforts required for
successful attacks. Hence, we next resort to an empirical but
comprehensive study. As we observe in this study, we can
indeed expect prohibitive runtimes for large-scale camouflag-
ing. More specifically, e.g., we observe a polynomial trend
for attacking the benchmark aes core, setting in around 14%
camouflaging (Fig. 13). Similar observations have also been
made by Yu et al. [16], albeit for a different primitive and the
much smaller benchmark c432 with 209 two-input gates; even
such a small layout could not be resolved within three days.
Comparison with prior art on large-scale camouflaging:
In Table X, we list runtimes for the seminal SAT-based
attack [15], [31], evaluating our camouflaging primitive and
those of [7]–[9], [11]. Note that these prior studies did not
report on any SAT-based attacks for large-scale camouflaging
themselves. Also, recall that we camouflage the same sets of
gates across all techniques for a fair comparison for each run,
and that we report average runtimes over ten such runs.
For our scheme, we do not observe any significant dif-
ferences for the average SAT-based attack runtimes when
considering different ranges of INVs/BUFs being transformed
(Sec. V-A). This is because, for cases with less INVs/BUFs
being selected for transformation, more other gates are selected
for camouflaging, while the overall count of camouflaged gates
remains the same; recall that we use the camouflaging scale
as design-wide “knob” for all of our experiments.
We note that none of the layouts can be de-camouflaged
within 48 hours once full-chip camouflaging is applied. In
fact, almost all layouts remain already resilient beyond 40%
camouflaging scale; the only exception arises for the ISCAS-
85 benchmark c7552 when the most simple camouflaging
primitive [9] is leveraged. We ran further exploratory attacks
for 7 days on large-scale camouflaging using our primitive—
without observing any improvement for the attack. For a more
meaningful comparison, we also consider relatively small
camouflaging scales, i.e., 10% up to 30%. Here, the primitive
by Zhang et al. [9] appears as the weakest and that by Wang
et al. [8] as the most resilient. Our primitive is next only to
those of [8], [11]. However, it is also important to recall that
ours incurs significantly less APD cost (Sec. VI-B).
We also leverage the Double DIP attack, provided by Shen
et al. [21], [32]. The crux of their attack is that it can rule
out at least two incorrect keys during the application of one
single distinguishing input pattern (DIP) for the oracle. While
conducting the same set of experiments as above, we observe
that the average runtimes are even higher across all bench-
marks and camouflaging schemes (Table XI). For example, for
the ITC-99 benchmark b14 C with 10% camouflaging applied
using our primitive, we observe ≈137 seconds for [31], but
≈402 seconds for [32]. Thus, we conclude that Double DIP,
while successful for attacking dedicated protection schemes
such as SARLock cannot cope well with large-scale camou-
flaging schemes in general.
Overall, we are not claiming that large-scale camouflaging,
whether based on prior art or our primitive, cannot be resolved
eventually using SAT-based attacks. Rather, we provide strong
empirical evidence that practically secure camouflaging, i.e.,
once 50–100% of all gates are camouflaged, imposes pro-
hibitive computational cost on SAT solvers.
On the (lack of) resilience for [27]: Since our work
is inspired to some degree by that of Chen et al. [27], it
seems imperative to investigate the resilience of their scheme
as well, especially since Chen et al. did not consider any
SAT-based attacks themselves. In Table XII, we note that
the SAT-based attack [15], [31] can distinguish between real
and dummy interconnects within relatively short runtimes, no
matter how many interconnects are obfuscated, i.e., at least
concerning the delay constraints defined in [27]. That is, an
overly constrained obfuscation as proposed in [27] cannot
withstand powerful SAT-based attacks. Similar observations
have been also reported by Yu et al. [16].
D. Security Evaluation: Fab Adversaries, Proximity Attacks
Similar to the observations made for SAT-based attacks, here
we find that our scheme of obfuscating the interconnects—
along with all the additional wiring going through both the
FEOL and BEOL—serves also well to hinder proximity at-
tacks. That is essentially due to vast numbers of wires being
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TABLE X
AVERAGE RUNTIMES (IN SECONDS) FOR THE SEMINAL SAT-BASED ATTACK [15], [31] ON SELECTED ISCAS-85 AND ITC-99 BENCHMARKS
Benchmark
10% Camouflaging Scale 20% Camouflaging Scale
[9] [7] [7] [11] [8] Our [9] [7] [7] [11] [8] Our
(2)∗ (3)∗ (4)∗ (8)∗ (16)∗ (10–14)∗ (2)∗ (3)∗ (4)∗ (8)∗ (16)∗ (10–14)∗
b14 C 13.77 36.12 87.14 230.05 9,735.42 136.66 31.09 186.46 794.64 39,341.2 48,399.9 6,674.53
b15 C 20.93 77.24 172.27 1,010.27 5,070.97 708.31 69.21 621.75 1,592.64 8,938.47 t-o 4,375.3
b17 C 256.71 1,174.39 2,103.08 23,408.4 t-o 15,807.3 864.55 11,202.6 30,629 t-o t-o t-o
b20 C 56.35 176.81 323.81 1,909.9 8,755.17 1,117.02 160.731 1,839.28 22,371.4 56,492.6 t-o t-o
b22 C 121.25 446.33 1,128.02 6,289.34 25,814.6 2,864.64 1,291.26 10,835.2 22,309.8 t-o t-o t-o
c3540 1.47 3.32 4.08 12.04 27.72 22.02 3.58 7.88 16.10 54.24 599.95 50.80
c5315 0.65 1.85 4.03 12.88 22.90 7.73 1.86 7.11 20.90 144.18 369.28 44.57
c7552 1.13 21.39 8.62 33.54 132.96 19.89 4.53 35.26 106.64 237.83 884.75 219.79
30% Camouflaging Scale 40% Camouflaging Scale and Beyond§
b14 C 115.78 1,659.75 14,180.7 t-o t-o t-o 2,560.86 96,271.4 t-o t-o t-o t-o
b15 C 349.34 2,481.25 9,165.07 t-o t-o t-o 759.22 24,442.9 t-o t-o t-o t-o
b17 C 3,046.33 68,028.1 t-o t-o t-o t-o 14,970.7 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
b20 C 2,406.48 6,027.25 t-o t-o t-o t-o 5,245.08 155,278 t-o t-o t-o t-o
b22 C 3,754.7 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o 16,923.9 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
c3540 6.30 35.25 95.48 22,613.6 t-o t-o 26.29 747.53 3,478.63 t-o t-o t-o
c5315 5.88 22.91 87.42 323.62 4,971.03 88.92 13.50 62.80 1,538.92 1,447.68 t-o 2,021.74
c7552 26.40 91.07 1,618.37 14,017 9,127.99 21,850.9 48.33–28,448.8§ 171.55 4,532.72 t-o t-o t-o
For a fair evaluation, the same sets of gates are camouflaged across all camouflaging techniques: for a given benchmark, gates are randomly selected once and then memorized.
Ten such random sets are generated for each benchmark. Time-out “t-o” is 48 hours, i.e., 172,800 seconds. ∗Number of obfuscated functionalities we assume; refer to related
publication for the actual sets of functionalities. §The runtime range reported for ISCAS-85 benchmark c7552 being obfuscated with [9] is for 40–100% camouflaging scale. All
other runtimes here correspond to 40% camouflaging scale; we found that 50% camouflaging scale occurs t-o for all other cases.
cut at the split layer, creating a large solution space for the
attacks to work on. Besides, recall that the metrics used in this
section have been introduced in Sec VI-A.
We execute the seminal network-flow attack [33], [35] on
different layouts for major camouflaging scales and for two
split layers, M3 and M4, on selected ISCAS-85 benchmarks
(Table XIII).9 As indicated, we observe that our scheme is
effective in mitigating this attack. The average CCR observed
for original layouts is significantly reduced for fully cam-
ouflaged layouts, namely by 7.48× and 2.41× when split
after M3 and M4, respectively. This significant reduction in
CCR is corroborated by the increase of cut wires to handle
when attacking our scheme, reported as cut inputs (CI) [33] in
Table XIII. For example for the ISCAS-85 benchmarks c5315
and c7552, CI is increased by 4.61× and 7.98×, respectively,
when comparing fully camouflaged to regular layouts, both
split after M3. Again, this increase in CI is due to the fact our
scheme routes all nets related to the camouflaging primitive
through higher layers.
Regarding the impact of the camouflaging scale and split
layer, we observe the following. First, for both layers, there
is a significant CCR reduction already for 20% camouflaging
over original layouts, namely by ≈2.1×. This implies that a
relatively small-scaled application of our scheme is sufficient
to significantly weaken this attack [33], [35], and this holds
true across split layers. Second, for M3, increasing the camou-
flaging scale helps to reduce the CCR notably further, whereas
the CCR remains at ≈26.4% for M4 across camouflaging
scales. This implies that our scheme is more effective when
lower split layers are considered, which can be expected and
has been discussed before in general, e.g., in [39].
We also study the quality (or rather, lack thereof) for the
netlists recovered by [33], [35]. In Table XIV, we report
HD and OER values across camouflaging scales and split
layers. The OER values reveal errors for all the netlists,
9We execute the attack also for the larger ITC-99 benchmarks, but it failed
to conclude within 48 hours.
irrespective of the camouflaging scale. Concerning HD, we
observe many errors as well, already for 20% camouflaging
scale, and for full-chip camouflaging, HD is approaching the
ideal value (50%) for all the netlists recovered across both split
layers. Therefore, aside from CCR, we also demonstrate that
netlists recovered by [33], [35] deviate significantly in terms
of functional behavior from the original layouts.
Finally, we also conduct the routing-congestion-aware at-
tack crouting by Magan˜a et al. [34], [36] for the larger ITC-
99 benchmarks (Table XV). We observe a significant increase
of vpins once larger camouflaging scales are effected: across
all benchmarks, on average, the increase is 12.55× for 100%
camouflaging when compared to original, unprotected layouts.
The number of candidates E[LS], which represents the possible
pairings for each cut net to consider, increases accordingly
as well. As a result, the attack complexity, represented by
FOM, increases on average by 9.30× and 24.15× for split
layers M3 and M4, respectively. Considering the impact of the
camouflaging scale and split layer, we observe similar trends
as above. That is, we note already for 20% camouflaging
a significant increase in the FOM, for both split layers.
Furthermore, our scheme remains more resilient at M3, while
FOM for M4 increase well with the camouflaging scale here.
Overall, we find that our scheme weakens the prospects of the
crouting attack [34], [36] significantly.
VII. CONCLUSION
Given the manifold limitations of the prior art for
camouflaging—regarding applicability, layout overheads, as
well as resilience—we argue that new avenues are called
for. Note that this argument also applies to provably secure
schemes, where important fallacies have been demonstrated,
namely algorithmic attacks tailored for identification and/or
removal of the additional, dedicated circuitry required by such
schemes, as well as their inherently low output corruptibility.
Here, we promote the obfuscation of interconnects as such a
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TABLE XI
AVERAGE RUNTIMES (IN SECONDS) FOR THE SAT-BASED Double DIP ATTACK [21], [32] ON SELECTED ISCAS-85 AND ITC-99 BENCHMARKS
Benchmark
10% Camouflaging Scale 20% Camouflaging Scale
[9] [7] [7] [11] [8] Our [9] [7] [7] [11] [8] Our
(2)∗ (3)∗ (4)∗ (8)∗ (16)∗ (10–14)∗ (2)∗ (3)∗ (4)∗ (8)∗ (16)∗ (10–14)∗
b14 C 33.37 111.33 208.44 895.31 21,105.4 401.72 104.94 1,055.62 8,321.02 57,994.1 t-o 40,864.9
b15 C 40.43 201.85 466.89 3,175.39 8,597.58 2,114.4 180.37 1,875.68 7,384.14 77,413.2 t-o 10,978.8
b17 C 525.67 3,697.23 5,981.08 42,388.8 t-o 28,947.9 3,144.69 26,809.5 t-o t-o t-o t-o
b20 C 136.61 481.91 867.28 7,139.19 36,219.7 2,428.97 565.67 5,623.08 t-o t-o t-o t-o
b22 C 328.95 1,190.92 5,400.59 26,008.8 t-o 8,251.29 2,741.11 18,991.2 52,371.2 t-o t-o t-o
c3540 3.46 5.66 8.18 43.10 78.38 12.27 7.18 14.62 64.59 363.86 41,367.5 2,786.15
c5315 1.40 5.36 12.81 30.82 51.28 18.04 3.54 21.45 53.15 453.45 1,490.21 133.41
c7552 2.91 7.07 12.72 93.26 248.06 32.68 12.47 39.75 168.51 434.51 1,924.91 2,902.32
30% Camouflaging Scale 40% Camouflaging Scale and Beyond§
b14 C 766.24 15,403.6 70,325.5 t-o t-o t-o 37,126.4 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
b15 C 977.73 5,795.87 65,201.1 t-o t-o t-o 3,182.87 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
b17 C 12,726.7 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
b20 C 9,980.07 24,536.5 t-o t-o t-o t-o 40,946.3 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
b22 C 10,383.5 145,677 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
c3540 22.35 698.09 1,426.13 t-o t-o t-o 320.72 31,375.4 t-o t-o t-o t-o
c5315 11.34 40.66 240.28 918.40 t-o 1,879.85 35.93 1,398.75 90,724.9 46,661.2 t-o t-o
c7552 65.49 2,205.62 22,785.3 t-o t-o t-o 137.8–106,213§ 25,862.3 9,782.61 t-o t-o t-o
Refer to Table X for footnotes.
TABLE XII
RUNTIME, IN SECONDS, FOR THE SAT-BASED ATTACK [15], [31] ON
INTERCONNECTS OBFUSCATION [27] ON SELECTED ITC-99 BENCHMARKS
Benchmark N1 Time for N1 N2 Time for N2 N3 Time for N3
b14 C 30 7 36 9 55 11
b15 C 38 7 44 8 84 15
b17 C 92 149 198 170 272 214
b18 C 265 2,964 334 3,223 518 3,816
b19 C 438 4,685 583 5,393 893 7,684
b20 C 48 35 85 46 166 70
b21 C 54 29 76 56 168 63
b22 C 76 58 113 79 191 128
We model the attack as outlined in Fig. 3 of [16], i.e., by inserting 2-to-1 MUXes fed
by real and dummy wires. Columns N1, N2, and N3 quote the number of dummy
wires, while limiting the delay overheads to 0%, 3%, and 5%, respectively, as proposed
in [27]. Since the exact locations of dummy wires and other details are not reported
in [27], we insert N1–N3 wires randomly into the netlists available at our end. Time
for N1–N3 denote the total runtime for attacking the related netlists.
promising avenue going beyond the prior art, especially for
efficient IP protection at large scales.
Toward this end, we propose and implement BEOL-
centric camouflaging primitives which are applicable to any
FEOL node, and integrate them within a commercial-grade
CAD framework. We strive for practically relevant layout
evaluation—all our camouflaged layouts are DRC-clean at the
GDSII level, and we consider traditional but also modern,
large-scale benchmark suites. We thoroughly contrast ours to
the prior art, both in terms of layout cost and resilience. For
the latter, we have leveraged powerful SAT-based attacks and
proximity attacks. Our scheme hinders both threats ultimately
by virtue of scale and entanglement. For SAT-based attacks,
we show that tackling our large-scale camouflaging scheme
becomes computationally too expensive; for proximity attacks,
we show that the large-scale increase of cut wires at the FEOL-
BEOL interface, which our schemes incurs by construction, is
reducing the effectiveness of such attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme is
the first that can deliver low-cost and resilient full-chip
camouflaging. That is especially true when also considering
the protection offered against fab adversaries, enabled by
split manufacturing applied in conjunction with our notion of
obfuscating the interconnects.
TABLE XIII
RESULTS FOR PROXIMITY ATTACK [33], [35] ON SELECTED ISCAS-85
BENCHMARKS
Benchmark LC Split after M3 Split after M4Scale CI CCR R-T CI CCR R-T
c1908
Original 39 66 0.54 11 45 0.54
20% 142 34 0.92 33 33 0.99
40% 208 21 2.35 178 19 1.23
60% 284 15 11.59 265 43 3.76
80% 356 11 17.85 327 29 6.58
100% 411 9 30.11 371 25 8.49
c3540
Original 291 78 2.07 22 100 1.89
20% 778 26 296.84 463 33 25.68
40% 878 20 377.87 608 24 44.39
60% 1,017 11 728.34 819 19 94.71
80% 1,224 12 1,420.87 1,032 26 206.45
100% 1,409 6 2,138.83 1,262 22 1,028.66
c5315
Original 405 55 5.21 135 40 2.15
20% 1,002 29 353.64 574 25 19.02
40% 1,325 23 840.93 930 32 141.66
60% 1,490 13 2,696.78 1,182 28 448.9
80% 1,582 9 3,529.51 1,363 26 1,157.74
100% 1,866 10 4,857.38 1,610 28 660.14
c7552
Original 252 48 5.02 99 63 5.18
20% 950 29 495.7 594 20 41.66
40% 1,249 18 632.97 959 22 265.67
60% 1,489 12 2,588.73 1,294 20 774.15
80% 1,818 10 3,525.18 1,645 26 1,515.38
100% 2,011 8 11,358.27 1,891 28 2,408.11
Avg. for Original – 246.75 61.75 3.21 66.75 62 2.44
Avg. for 20% LC – 718 29.5 286.78 416 27.75 21.84
Avg. for 40% LC – 915 20.5 463.52 668.75 24.25 113.24
Avg. for 60% LC – 1,070 12.75 1,506.36 890 27.5 330.38
Avg. for 80% LC – 1,245 10.5 2,123.35 1,091.75 26.75 721.54
Avg. for 100% LC – 1,424.25 8.25 4,596.15 1,283.5 25.75 1.026.35
CCR is correct connection rate (%), CI is cut inputs, and R-T is runtime (s).
As for future work, we will study in more detail the formal
underpinnings for computational cost induced on algorithmic
attacks by our scheme. We also plan to demonstrate that our
scheme suffers neither from low output corruptibility, ren-
dering it resilient against approximate SAT-based attacks like
AppSAT [20], nor from removal attacks [22], [23], which is
both in contrast to provably secure schemes. A straightforward
intuition here is that our scheme intertwines camouflaging
within the netlist at large scales, where any false inferences
can propagate throughout the whole netlist, whereas provably
secure schemes protect only particular patterns/outputs.
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TABLE XIV
HD, OER FOR NETLISTS OBTAINED BY PROXIMITY ATTACK [33], [35]
LC Scale: 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Benchmark HD OER HD OER HD OER HD OER HD OERSplit after M3
c1908 38.93 99.99 40.14 99.99 45.67 99.99 47.71 99.99 49.85 99.99
c3540 42.74 99.99 44.59 99.99 45.86 99.99 49.67 99.99 49.79 99.99
c5315 43.23 99.99 46.81 99.99 47.89 99.99 49.51 99.99 50.78 99.99
c7552 45.62 99.99 47.5 99.99 49.04 99.99 47.78 99.99 48.73 99.99
Average 42.63 99.99 44.76 99.99 47.11 99.99 48.67 99.99 49.79 99.99
Split after M4
c1908 35.49 99.99 38.34 99.99 43.89 99.99 46.31 99.99 47.43 99.99
c3540 40.34 99.99 43.19 99.99 44.56 99.99 47.91 99.99 48.43 99.99
c5315 42.87 99.99 43.87 99.99 45.91 99.99 47.17 99.99 48.78 99.99
c7552 44.12 99.99 45.52 99.99 46.78 99.99 45.78 99.99 47.89 99.99
Average 40.71 99.99 42.73 99.99 45.29 99.99 46.79 99.99 48.13 99.99
HD and OER are Hamming distance and output error rates, respectively; both are
reported in percentage.
TABLE XV
RESULTS FOR crouting PROXIMITY ATTACK [34], [36] ON SELECTED
ITC-99 BENCHMARKS
Benchmark LC Split after M3 Split after M4Scale vpins E[LS] FOM vpins E[LS] FOM
b14 C
Original 224 1.78 0.04 28 0.32 0.01
20% 1,146 13.03 0.27 950 12.36 0.26
40% 1,832 18.26 0.38 1,624 17.1 0.36
60% 2,234 19.78 0.41 2,062 18.98 0.4
80% 3,060 21.01 0.44 2,924 20.31 0.42
100% 3,310 22.02 0.46 3,144 21.29 0.44
b15 C
Original 458 2.74 0.06 174 1.59 0.03
20% 1,342 9.88 0.27 1,144 10.44 0.29
40% 2,060 12.37 0.34 1,930 12.71 0.35
60% 2,852 17.82 0.37 2,820 18.38 0.38
80% 3,430 18.54 0.39 3,478 19.17 0.4
100% 3,988 19.95 0.42 3,972 20.33 0.42
b17 C
Original 1,500 9.08 0.05 68 4.42 0.02
20% 4,382 36.78 0.23 3,310 40.65 0.26
40% 6,628 38.06 0.28 N/A N/A N/A
60% 9,050 53.19 0.28 8,724 53.27 0.28
80% 11,258 59.44 0.3 11,230 60.15 0.31
100% 12,586 65.3 0.33 12,234 63.69 0.33
b20 C
Original 448 3.21 0.03 100 0.82 0.01
20% 2,714 28.19 0.3 2,068 27.72 0.3
40% 4,116 35.18 0.37 3,600 33.17 0.35
60% 5,386 24.45 0.39 5,182 23.9 0.38
80% 6,616 27.39 0.43 6,378 26.73 0.42
100% 7,880 51.61 0.43 7,438 48.8 0.41
b21 C
Original 520 3.58 0.04 106 0.96 0.01
20% 2,636 24.26 0.31 1,942 22.41 0.29
40% 3,826 32.64 0.34 3,366 31.29 0.33
60% 4,938 36.3 0.38 4,702 35.88 0.38
80% 7,026 39.98 0.4 6,852 37.86 0.38
100% 7,910 43.87 0.44 7,400 41.31 0.41
b22 C
Original 974 4.85 0.05 312 1.86 0.02
20% 3,966 32.87 0.28 2,978 31.51 0.28
40% 5,886 41.11 0.35 5,140 39.29 0.34
60% 8,152 36.69 0.37 7,634 34.99 0.35
80% 9,774 40.77 0.41 9,538 39.52 0.4
100% 10,362 42.57 0.43 9,964 41.03 0.41
The metric vpin is number of open two-pin nets, E[LS] is the number of candidates
over a specific region, and FOM is the figure of merit for attack complexity, as defined
in [36] and explained in Sec. VI-A. N/A denotes attack failures. For a fair comparison
across different benchmarks and layouts, we setup up each run with a bounding-box
size equal to 1/8 of the half perimeter of the respective die outlines.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Patnaik et al., “Obfuscating the interconnects: Low-cost and resilient
full-chip layout camouflaging,” in Proc. ICCAD, 2017, pp. 41–48.
[2] M. Rostami et al., “A primer on hardware security: Models, methods,
and metrics,” Proc. IEEE, vol. 102, no. 8, pp. 1283–1295, 2014.
[3] M. Tehranipoor et al., Eds., Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust.
Springer, 2012.
[4] T. Sugawara et al., “Reversing stealthy dopant-level circuits,” J. Cryp-
togr. Eng., vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 85–94, 2015.
[5] Y. Lao et al., “Obfuscating DSP circuits via high-level transformations,”
Trans. VLSI Syst., vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 819–830, 2015.
[6] R. P. Cocchi et al., “Circuit camouflage integration for hardware IP
protection,” in Proc. Des. Autom. Conf., 2014, pp. 1–5.
[7] J. Rajendran et al., “Security analysis of integrated circuit camouflag-
ing,” in Proc. Comp. Comm. Sec., 2013, pp. 709–720.
[8] X. Wang et al., “Secure and low-overhead circuit obfuscation technique
with multiplexers,” in Proc. Gr. Lakes Symp. VLSI, 2016, pp. 133–136.
[9] J. Zhang, “A practical logic obfuscation technique for hardware security,”
Trans. VLSI Syst., vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 1193–1197, 2016.
[10] M. I. M. Collantes et al., “Threshold-dependent camouflaged cells to
secure circuits against reverse engineering attacks,” in Proc. Comp. Soc.
Symp. VLSI, 2016, pp. 443–448.
[11] I. R. Nirmala et al., “A novel threshold voltage defined switch for circuit
camouflaging,” in Proc. Europe Test. Symp., 2016, pp. 1–2.
[12] B. Erbagci et al., “A secure camouflaged threshold voltage defined logic
family,” in Proc. HOST, 2016, pp. 229–235.
[13] N. Akkaya et al., “A secure camouflaged logic family using postmanu-
facturing programming with a 3.6GHz adder prototype in 65nm CMOS
at 1V nominal VDD,” in Proc. Int. Sol.-St. Circ. Conf., 2018.
[14] M. El Massad et al., “The SAT attack on IC camouflaging: Impact and
potential countermeasures,” Trans. Comp.-Aided Des. Integ. Circ. Sys.,
2019.
[15] P. Subramanyan et al., “Evaluating the security of logic encryption
algorithms,” in Proc. HOST, 2015, pp. 137–143.
[16] C. Yu et al., “Incremental SAT-based reverse engineering of camou-
flaged logic circuits,” Trans. Comp.-Aided Des. Integ. Circ. Sys., vol. 36,
no. 10, pp. 1647–1659, 2017.
[17] M. Li et al., “Provably secure camouflaging strategy for IC protection,”
in Proc. ICCAD, 2016, pp. 28:1–28:8.
[18] M. Yasin et al., “CamoPerturb: Secure IC camouflaging for minterm
protection,” in Proc. ICCAD, 2016, pp. 29:1–29:8.
[19] Y. Xie et al., “Mitigating SAT attack on logic locking,” in Proc.
Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Sys., 2016, pp. 127–146.
[20] K. Shamsi et al., “AppSAT: Approximately deobfuscating integrated
circuits,” in Proc. HOST, 2017, pp. 95–100.
[21] Y. Shen et al., “Double DIP: Re-evaluating security of logic encryption
algorithms,” in Proc. Gr. Lakes Symp. VLSI, 2017, pp. 179–184.
[22] X. Xu et al., “Novel bypass attack and BDD-based tradeoff analysis
against all known logic locking attacks,” in Proc. Cryptogr. Hardw.
Embed. Sys., 2017.
[23] M. Yasin et al., “Removal attacks on logic locking and camouflaging
techniques,” Trans. Emerg. Top. Comp., vol. PP, no. 99, 2017.
[24] A. Vijayakumar et al., “Physical design obfuscation of hardware: A
comprehensive investigation of device- and logic-level techniques,”
Trans. Inf. Forens. Sec., vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 64–77, 2017.
[25] J. Rajendran et al., “Regaining trust in VLSI design: Design-for-trust
techniques,” Proc. IEEE, vol. 102, no. 8, pp. 1266–1282, 2014.
[26] J. Knechtel et al., “Protect your chip design intellectual property: An
overview,” in Proc. Conf. Omni-Layer Intell. Sys., 2019, pp. 211–216.
[27] S. Chen et al., “A chip-level anti-reverse engineering technique,” J.
Emerg. Tech. Comp. Sys., vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 29:1–29:20, 2018.
[28] DfX Lab, NYUAD. [Online]. Available: https://sites.nyuad.nyu.edu/
dfx/research-topics/design-for-trust-ic-camouflaging/
[29] C. McCants, “Trusted integrated chips (TIC) program,” IARPA, Tech.
Rep., 2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.ndia.org/-/media/sites/
ndia/meetings-and-events/divisions/systems-engineering/past-events/
trusted-micro/2016-august/mccants-carl.ashx
[30] K. Vaidyanathan et al., “Building trusted ICs using split fabrication,” in
Proc. HOST, 2014, pp. 1–6.
[31] P. Subramanyan. (2017) Evaluating the security of logic encryption
algorithms. [Online]. Available: https://bitbucket.org/spramod/host15-
logic-encryption
[32] Y. Shen et al., “Double DIP: Re-evaluating security of logic encryption
algorithms,” Provided as courtesy by the authors, 2017.
[33] L. Feng et al. (2018) The cat and mouse in split manufacturing.
[Online]. Available: https://github.com/seth-tamu/network flow attack
[34] J. Magan˜a et al. (2018) Are proximity attacks a threat to the security
of split manufacturing of integrated circuits? [Online]. Available:
http://homepages.cae.wisc.edu/∼adavoodi/
[35] Y. Wang et al., “The cat and mouse in split manufacturing,” Trans. VLSI
Syst., vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 805–817, 2018.
[36] J. Magan˜a et al., “Are proximity attacks a threat to the security of split
manufacturing of integrated circuits?” Trans. VLSI Syst., vol. 25, no. 12,
2017.
[37] B. Zhang et al., “Analysis of security of split manufacturing using
machine learning,” in Proc. Des. Autom. Conf., 2018, pp. 141:1–141:6.
[38] H. Li et al., “Attacking split manufacturing from a deep learning
perspective,” in Proc. Des. Autom. Conf., 2019, pp. 135:1–135:6.
16 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS
[39] A. Sengupta et al., “Rethinking split manufacturing: An information-
theoretic approach with secure layout techniques,” in Proc. ICCAD,
2017, pp. 329–336.
[40] L. Feng et al., “Making split fabrication synergistically secure and
manufacturable,” in Proc. ICCAD, 2017.
[41] S. Patnaik et al., “Concerted wire lifting: Enabling secure and cost-
effective split manufacturing,” in Proc. Asia South Pa. Des. Autom.
Conf., 2018, pp. 251–258.
[42] ——, “Raise your game for split manufacturing: Restoring the true
functionality through BEOL,” in Proc. Des. Autom. Conf., 2018, pp.
140:1–140:6.
[43] (2011) NanGate FreePDK45 Open Cell Library. Nangate Inc. [Online].
Available: http://www.nangate.com/?page id=2325
[44] M. Yasin et al., “Provably-secure logic locking: From theory to practice,”
in Proc. Comp. Comm. Sec., 2017, pp. 1601–1618.
[45] S. Jiang et al., “An efficient technique to reverse engineer minterm
protection based camouflaged circuit,” J. Comp. Sci. Tech., vol. 33, no. 5,
pp. 998–1006, 2018.
[46] M. Yasin et al., “Security analysis of Anti-SAT,” in Proc. Asia South
Pa. Des. Autom. Conf., 2017, pp. 342–347.
[47] C. Helfmeier et al., “Breaking and entering through the silicon,” in Proc.
Comp. Comm. Sec., 2013, pp. 733–744.
[48] J. Swerts et al., “BEOL compatible high tunnel magneto resistance
perpendicular magnetic tunnel junctions using a sacrificial Mg layer as
CoFeB free layer cap,” Appl. Phys. Lett., vol. 106, no. 26, pp. 262 407:1–
262 407:4, 2015.
[49] ——, “Solving the BEOL compatibility challenge of top-pinned mag-
netic tunnel junction stacks,” in Proc. Int. Elec. Devices Meeting, 2017,
pp. 38.6.1–38.6.4.
[50] S.-W. Hwang et al., “A physically transient form of silicon electronics,”
Science, vol. 337, no. 6102, pp. 1640–1644, 2012.
[51] A. Todri-Sanial et al., Eds., Carbon Nanotubes for Interconnects.
Springer, 2017.
[52] A. Naeemi et al., “BEOL scaling limits and next generation technology
prospects,” in Proc. Des. Autom. Conf., 2014, pp. 26:1–26:6.
[53] Confidential communication with industry partners, 2017.
[54] K. Xiao et al., “Efficient and secure split manufacturing via obfuscated
built-in self-authentication,” in Proc. HOST, 2015, pp. 14–19.
[55] I. L. Markov, “Limits on fundamental limits to computation,” Nature,
vol. 512, no. 7513, pp. 147–154, 2014.
[56] L. Amaru`. (2015) Majority-inverter graph (MIG) benchmark suite.
[Online]. Available: http://lsi.epfl.ch/MIG
[57] Tools for SM working on DEF files – DfX Lab, NYUAD. [Online].
Available: https://github.com/DfX-NYUAD/SM DEF tools
[58] S. Malik et al., “Development of a layout-level hardware obfuscation
tool,” in Proc. Comp. Soc. Symp. VLSI, 2015, pp. 204–209.
[59] S. Amir et al., “Development and evaluation of hardware obfuscation
benchmarks,” J. Hardw. Sys. Sec., vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 142–161, 2018.
[60] M. Yasin et al., “On improving the security of logic locking,” Trans.
Comp.-Aided Des. Integ. Circ. Sys., vol. 35, no. 9, pp. 1411–1424, 2016.
Satwik Patnaik (S’16) received B.E. in Electron-
ics and Telecommunications from the University of
Pune, India and M.Tech. in Computer Science and
Engineering with a specialization in VLSI Design
from Indian Institute of Information Technology and
Management, Gwalior, India. He is a final year
Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Electrical
and Computer Engineering at the Tandon School
of Engineering with New York University, Brook-
lyn, NY, USA. He is also a Global Ph.D. Fellow
with New York University Abu Dhabi, U.A.E. He
received the Bronze Medal in the Graduate category at the ACM/SIGDA
Student Research Competition (SRC) held at ICCAD 2018, and the best
paper award at the Applied Research Competition (ARC) held in conjunction
with Cyber Security Awareness Week (CSAW), 2017. His current research
interests include Hardware security, Trust and reliability issues for CMOS
and emerging devices with particular focus on low-power VLSI Design. He
is a student member of IEEE and ACM.
Mohammed Ashraf is a Senior Physical Design
engineer from India. He obtained his Bachelor’s
degree in electronics and telecommunication engi-
neering from College of Engineering Trivandrum,
Kerala, in 2005. He carries an experience of 10 years
in the VLSI industry. He has worked with various
multi-national companies like NVIDIA Graphics,
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), and Wipro Tech-
nologies. He worked also with Dubai Circuit Design,
Dubai Silicon Oasis, UAE. Mr. Ashraf is currently
a Research Engineer at Center for Cyber Security
(CCS) at New York University Abu Dhabi.
Ozgur Sinanoglu (M’11–SM’15) is a Professor of
Electrical and Computer Engineering at New York
University Abu Dhabi. He earned his B.S. degrees,
one in Electrical and Electronics Engineering and
one in Computer Engineering, both from Bogazici
University, Turkey in 1999. He obtained his MS and
PhD in Computer Science and Engineering from
University of California San Diego in 2001 and
2004, respectively. He has industry experience at TI,
IBM and Qualcomm, and has been with NYU Abu
Dhabi since 2010. During his PhD, he won the IBM
PhD fellowship award twice. He is also the recipient of the best paper awards
at IEEE VLSI Test Symposium 2011 and ACM Conference on Computer and
Communication Security 2013.
Prof. Sinanoglu’s research interests include design-for-test, design-for-
security and design-for-trust for VLSI circuits, where he has more than 180
conference and journal papers, and 20 issued and pending US Patents. Prof.
Sinanoglu has given more than a dozen tutorials on hardware security and trust
in leading CAD and test conferences, such as DAC, DATE, ITC, VTS, ETS,
ICCD, ISQED, etc. He is serving as track/topic chair or technical program
committee member in about 15 conferences, and as (guest) associate editor for
IEEE TIFS, IEEE TCAD, ACM JETC, IEEE TETC, Elsevier MEJ, JETTA,
and IET CDT journals.
Prof. Sinanoglu is the director of the Design-for-Excellence Lab at NYU
Abu Dhabi. His recent research in hardware security and trust is being
funded by US National Science Foundation, US Department of Defense,
Semiconductor Research Corporation, Intel Corp and Mubadala Technology.
Johann Knechtel (M’11) received the M.Sc. in In-
formation Systems Engineering (Dipl.-Ing.) in 2010
and the Ph.D. in Computer Engineering (Dr.-Ing.,
summa cum laude) in 2014, both from TU Dresden,
Germany. He is a Research Scientist at the New York
University, Abu Dhabi, UAE. Dr. Knechtel was a
Postdoctoral Researcher in 2015–16 at the Masdar
Institute of Science and Technology, Abu Dhabi.
From 2010 to 2014, he was a Ph.D. Scholar with the
DFG Graduate School on “Nano- and Biotechnolo-
gies for Packaging of Electronic Systems” hosted
at the TU Dresden. In 2012, he was a Research Assistant with the Dept.
of Computer Science and Engineering, Chinese University of Hong Kong,
China. In 2010, he was a Visiting Research Student with the Dept. of
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Michigan, USA.
His research interests cover VLSI Physical Design Automation, with particular
focus on Emerging Technologies and Hardware Security.
